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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
14357

LARRY BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
Appellant was charged with the crime of burglary
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) , as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of the crime of burglary
by a jury in the Court of the Honorable Gordon R. Hall on
November 4, 1975.

Appellant was sentenced to serve the

indeterminate term provided by law in the Utah State Prison,
namely, zero to five years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Two girls were driving south on State Street
in Salt Lake City shortly after midnight on May 9, 1975.
Near a pawn shop at 1588 South State Street, the girls
saw appellant who appeared to be hitchhiking (T. 4).

The

girls pulled over and talked to appellant for a short
time and then drove off (T.5).

The girls drove on down

State Street, turned around, and drove back past appellant.
At this time, he was looking in the windows of the pawn
shop (T.6).

The girls drove north and turned again and

proceeded south a second time.

This time as they went

by they saw appellant in front of the pawn shop with
something in his hands.

One of the girls said:

"I seen him standing in front
of Pahl's about the door, facing
northeast; and he had something in
his hands and was wrapping a cord
around it.
Q. Could you describe what that
something was?
A. It was black and it had silver
around it. Looked like an eight track
or, you know, a stereo of some kind."
(T.6).
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The girls also said that one of the store windows
had been broken, and that a bag of golf clubs was hanging
out of the break in the window (T.7).

The girls continued

south on State Street, turned around again and proceeded
north.

This time a police officer was at the pawn shop.

He had answered a burglar

alarm (T.35).

The girls

stopped and told the police officer about appellant (T.8) .
The officer arrested appellant a short distance away and
brought him back.

The girls identified him as the person they

had previously observed (T.9).
Appellant testified that he noticed a disturbance
at the pawn shop and came to see what was going on when an
officer apprehended him (T.60).

He claimed that he was not

involved whatsoever in breaking the window or in any burglary
(T.63).

No stolen items were found in his possession or at

his apartment (T.43).
The girls also testified that when they first saw
appellant he had a plastic bag with something white in it
and that he appeared to be very drunk (T.5,24,26), although
they could smell no alcohol (T.33).

Officer English testified

that he thought appellant was intoxicated but that he could
not smell alcohol.

Later he found several empty glue tubes
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in appellant's apartment.

The officer then said he

recognized the odor of glue coming from appellant (T.38).
Appellant was later taken to the hospital for treatment
of a possible overdose of glue fumes (T.44).

Finally,

Officer English testified that some of the broken
window glass had glue on it and that a plastic bag was
found directly below the broken window (T.40).

Further-

more, Officer English testified that appellant had several
particles or slivers of glass on his right coat sleeve
(T.37).
During the trial, appellant made a motion to
have instructions submitted to the jury concerning lesser
included offenses such as attempted burglary, criminal
mischief, or trespassing (T.71).

The motion was denied.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES.
Appellant asks this Court to reverse his conviction because the trial court refused to instruct the jury
on lesser included offenses of burglary.
that the trial judge acted correctly.

Respondent replies

The law of burglary
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in Utah was clearly broken.

The conviction was supported

by ample evidence, and there was no evidence to support any
instructions as asked for by appellant*
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1975) , provides:
"(1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters . . . a
building or any portion of a
building with intent to commit
a felony or theft. . . . "
Entry is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (Supp. 1975},
as:
11

(4) 'Enter1 means:
(a) Intrusion of any part
of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical
object under control of the actor."
Thus, it is obvious that a man is guilty of burglary if he
breaks a window of a building with intent to steal soaaething
from it.

It does not matter how he breaks the window; whether

it be by striking it with his arm or throwing a rock through
it.
Respondent submits that there is ample evidence
on which to convict appellant of burglary.

He was seen in

the vicinity, he was seen carrying something from the window,
glue was found on the broken glass and slivers were found in
his coat, and golf clubs were hanging out the window (T.6,
37,40).
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Furthermore there is no intent problem.

That

issue was raised and denied in the trial court
and has not been raised on appeal.

There is ample evidence

to support the intent to steal if that question had been
raised.
As to the lesser included offenses, appellant
has correctly cited the law.

As he points out:

" . . . the failure to present
for the jury's consideration a
party's theory by appropriate
instructions constitutes reversible
error." State v. Newtonf 144 P.2d
290 (Utah 1943).
However:
" . . . the defendant is entitled
to have the jury instructed on his
theory of the case if there is any
substantial evidence to justify giving
such instructions." State v. Johnson,
185 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1947).
(Emphasis added.)
That holding has been affirmed more recently by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d
70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969).
In a later case, the test was modified somewhat.
In State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970),
the Court held that the lesser included offense should be
offered if ". . . any reasonable view of the evidence
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would support such a verdict."

Id., at 812.

(Emphasis added.)

The Court went on to say:
". • . in this situation where the
question raised relates to the refusal
to submit included offenses, it is our
duty to survey the whole evidence and
the inferences naturally to be deduced
therefrom to see whether there is any
reasonable basis therein which would
support a conviction of the lesser
offenses." 463 P.2d at 814.
As we examine the evidence it will become apparent
that there is no "substantial" or "reasonable" evidence on which
to base the requested instruction.

"Attempt" is defined in

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1975), as follows:
"(1). . . a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the
offense, he engages in conduct constituting
a substantial step towards commission of
the offense."
Therefore, in order to have an attempted burglary
it would be necessary to have a man take a substantial step
towards breaking the glass, but without breaking it or causing
any other entry.

Once the glass was broken an entry had to

have been made and the crime can no longer be an attenqat
under the Utah statute.

Someone broke that glass, and if

that same person had the intent to steal, there was a burglary.
An attempted burglary simply cannot be reasonably construed
under any view of the evidence.
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As for trespass, that term is defined in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (Supp. 1975):
"(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in
sections 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains
unlawfully on property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance
or injury . . .
(ii) Intends to commit any
crime, other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to
whether his presence will cause fear
II

.

. . .

Appellant had not one shred of evidence that he entered the
pawn shop with one of the above intents.
he was not even there.

He testified that

Thus, he was basing his entire

defense on mistaken identity.

It was burglary or nothing,

with no middle ground.
Finally, as to criminal mischief, that is defined
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1975):
"(1) A person commits criminal
mischief if:
(a) . . . he damages or destroys
property with the intention of defrauding
an insurer; or
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully
tampers with the property of another and
thereby:
(i) Recklessly endangers
human life; or
(ii) Recklessly causes . . . .
a substantial interception or impairment of any public utility; or
(c) He intentionally damages,
defaces, or destroys the property of
another*"
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Again, appellant put forth not the least shred of evidence
which would support an instruction on this crime.
he had nothing to do with it.

He said

This was a case of committing

either burglary or nothing, and the jury found that appellant
was guilty as charged.
CONCLUSION
Since, under the Utah statute, burglary is defined
as the slightest entrance coupled with an intent to steal, it
is obvious that a broken glass window makes out a prima facie
case as far as "entrance" goes.

If that entrance is coupled

with an intent then burglary is committed.
gone too far to be an attempt.

The crime has

It is impossible to support a

lesser included offense instruction by any reasonable view of
the evidence in this case.

Appellant's conviction should be

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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